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Abstract: About two thirds of the WTO’s around 150 members are developing 
countries. They play an increasingly important and active role in the WTO because of 
their numbers, because they are becoming more important in the global economy, and 
because they increasingly look to trade as a vital tool in their development efforts. An 
attempt is made in this paper to examine whether the WTO policies have positive or 
negative effect on the trade of developing countries. The paper further discusses that 
the Doha Round of Talk is a myth, a fiction, or is it a reality. Can the spirit of Doha, 
which launched a new round of negotiations and work with an explicit pledge to 
deliver development-friendly results, be redeemed or not? Finally, it analyses the 
special differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations was completed in 1994 with the 
signing of the Uruguay Round Agreements at Marrakech. The Round produced a 
number of important achievements, including replacing the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as an institutional framework for overseeing trade 
negotiations and adjudicating trade disputes, with the World Trade Organization, and 
extending GATT/WTO rules of trade to new areas such as intellectual property and 
services. Among the most significant accomplishments of the Uruguay Round were its 
focus on the treatment of agricultural trade under the GATT and the resulting new 
disciplines on agricultural trade policy (Yeats, 1987; Bhagwati, et al., 1998; Rena, 
2006a).  
 
Until the Uruguay Round, agriculture received special treatment under GATT trade 
rules through loopholes, exceptions, and exemptions from most of the disciplines 
applying to manufactured goods. As a result, the GATT allowed countries to use 
measures disallowed for other sectors (e.g., export subsidies), and enabled countries to 
maintain a multitude of non-tariff barriers that restricted trade in agricultural products. 
Participants in the Uruguay Round continued the GATT’s special treatment of 
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agricultural trade by agreeing to separate disciplines on agriculture in the Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA), but initiated a process aimed at reducing or limiting the 
exemptions and bringing agriculture more fully under GATT disciplines (Finger, et al., 
1996; Bhagwati, et al., 1998; Merlinda, et al., 2004). 
 
Under the Agreement, countries agreed to substantially reduce agricultural support and 
protection by establishing disciplines in the areas of market access, domestic support, 
and export subsidies. Under market access, countries agreed to open markets by 
prohibiting non-tariff barriers (including quantitative import restrictions, variable 
import levies, discretionary import licensing, and voluntary export restraints), 
converting existing non-tariff barriers to tariffs, and reducing tariffs. URAA signatory 
countries also agreed to reduce expenditures on export subsidies and the quantity of 
agricultural products exported with subsidies, and prohibits the introduction of new 
export subsidies for agricultural products. Domestic support reductions were realized 
through commitments to reduce an aggregate measure of support (AMS), a numerical 
measure of the value of most trade distorting domestic policies. The agreement is 
implemented over a 6-year period, 1995-2000 (Rena, 2006a). This is a major challenge 
and opportunity as positive results would rectify some of the development shortfalls of 
the Uruguay Round, mainstream development into the WTO as a central principle, and 
provide development-enhancing rights and obligations that would enable the entire 
membership to use multilateral trade liberalization (MTL) and rules as a facilitating 
engine of trade as well as of development and poverty reduction. 
 
Emergence of WTO 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an organization that intends to supervise and 
liberalize international trade. The organization officially commenced on January 1, 1995 
under the Marrakech Agreement, replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which commenced in 1948. The organization deals with regulation of trade 
between participating countries; it provides a framework for negotiating and 
formalizing trade agreements, and a dispute resolution process aimed at enforcing 
participants' adherence to WTO agreements which are signed by representatives of 
member governments and ratified by their parliaments. Most of the issues that the WTO 
focuses on derive from previous trade negotiations, especially from the Uruguay Round 
(1986–1994) (Wikipedia, 2012). 
 
The organization is attempting to complete negotiations on the Doha Development 
Round, which was launched in 2001 with an explicit focus on addressing the needs of 
developing countries. According to a European Union statement, "The 2008 Ministerial 
meeting broke down over a disagreement between exporters of agricultural bulk 
commodities and countries with large numbers of subsistence farmers on the precise 
terms of a 'special safeguard measure' to protect farmers from surges in imports." The 
position of the European Commission is that "The successful conclusion of the Doha 
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negotiations would confirm the central role of multilateral liberalisation and rule-
making. It would confirm the WTO as a powerful shield against protectionist 
backsliding." An impasse remains. As of May 2012, the future of the Doha Round 
remains uncertain (Wikipedia, 2012). 
Functions of WTO 
Among the various functions of the WTO, these are regarded by analysts as the most 
important: the WTO oversees the implementation, administration and operation of the 
covered agreements. It provides a forum for negotiations and for settling disputes.  
Additionally, it is the WTO's duty to review and propagate the national trade policies, 
and to ensure the coherence and transparency of trade policies through surveillance in 
global economic policy-making. Another priority of the WTO is the assistance of 
developing, least-developed and low-income countries in transition to adjust to WTO 
rules and disciplines through technical cooperation and training. The WTO is also a 
center of economic research and analysis: regular assessments of the global trade 
picture in its annual publications and research reports on specific topics are produced 
by the organization. Finally, the WTO cooperates closely with the two other components 
of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF and the World Bank (Wikipedia, 2012).  
Doha Ministerial Declaration: 
The WTO launched the current round of negotiations, the Doha Development Round 
(DDR), at the fourth ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. The 
“Doha Ministerial Declaration”, adopted on November 14, 2001, Para 13 stated that 
member-countries commit themselves to “substantial improvements in market access, 
reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies, and substantial 
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. We can agree that a special and 
differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of all elements of 
the negotiations and shall be embodied in the schedules of concessions and 
commitments and as appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to 
be operationally effective and to enable developing countries like China and India and 
their development needs, including food security and rural development (Rena, 
2006b:73).  
This was to be an ambitious effort to make globalization more inclusive and help the 
world's poor, particularly by slashing barriers and subsidies in farming. The initial 
agenda comprised both further trade liberalization and new rule-making, underpinned 
by commitments to strengthen substantial assistance to developing countries. However, 
the negotiations have been highly contentious. Disagreements still continue over several 
key areas including agriculture subsidies, which emerged as critical in July 2006. As of 
April 2012, agreement has not been reached, despite intense negotiations at several 
ministerial conferences and at other sessions (Wikipedia, 2012). 
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Negotiations on agriculture began in early 2000, under Article 20 of the WTO 
Agriculture Agreement. By November 2001 and the Doha Ministerial Conference, 
121 governments had submitted a large number of negotiating proposals. These 
negotiations will continue, but now with the mandate given by the Doha Declaration, 
which also includes a series of deadlines. The declaration builds on the work already 
undertaken, confirms and elaborates the objectives, and sets a timetable. Agriculture is 
now part of the single undertaking in which virtually all the linked negotiations are to 
end by 1 January 2005. 
The declaration reconfirms the long-term objective already agreed in the present WTO 
Agreement: to establish a fair and market-oriented trading system through a 
programme of fundamental reform. The programme encompasses strengthened rules, 
and specific commitments on government support and protection for agriculture. The 
purpose is to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in world agricultural 
markets. Without prejudging the outcome, member governments commit themselves to 
comprehensive negotiations aimed at: 
1. market access: substantial reductions 
2. exports subsidies: reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of these 
3. domestic support: substantial reductions for supports that distort trade  
The declaration makes special and differential treatment for developing countries 
integral throughout the negotiations, both in countries' new commitments and in any 
relevant new or revised rules and disciplines. It says the outcome should be effective in 
practice and should enable developing countries meet their needs, in particular in food 
security and rural development. The ministers also take note of the non-trade concerns 
(such as environmental protection, food security, rural development, etc) reflected in 
the negotiating proposals already submitted. They confirm that the negotiations will 
take these into account, as provided for in the Agriculture Agreement (WTO, 2012). 
Small and/or developing economies face specific challenges in their participation in 
world trade, for example lack of economy of scale or limited natural resources. The 
Doha Declaration mandates the General Council to examine these problems and to 
make recommendations to the next Ministerial Conference as to what trade-related 
measures could improve the integration of small and/or developing economies. 
 
2. WTO and Least Developed Countries  
 
About two thirds of the WTO’s around 150 members are developing countries. They play 
an increasingly important and active role in the WTO because of their numbers, because 
they are becoming more important in the global economy, and because they increasingly 
look to trade as a vital tool in their development efforts. Developing countries are a 
highly diverse group often with very different views and concerns. The WTO agreements 
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include numerous provisions giving developing and least-developed countries special 
rights or extra leniency — “special and differential treatment”. Among these are 
provisions that allow developed countries to treat developing countries more favourably 
than other WTO members. 
 
The least developed countries (LDCs)  
Members reaffirmed their determination to fulfilling commitments made at Doha 
concerning LDCs. Various commitments have been made in respect of LDCs under the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration (DMD). Indeed, the Multilateral Trading System (MTS) 
must be sensitive to the special needs of LDCs. A key issue in this regard is the provision 
of duty-free and quota free market access for products originating in LDCs as called for 
in various international accords (Doha, LDC III, and Millennium Declaration). A report 
by UNCTAD on “A Trade Marshall Plan for LDCs” notes that, significant commercial 
gains would accrue to LDCs from the provision of bound duty free, quota treatment to 
all exports of LDCs by developed countries. Such treatment “is likely to bring welfare 
gains of as much as US$8 billion and will add up to US$6.4 billion (10 per cent) per year 
increase in LDC exports, which currently represent just 0.68 per cent of world trade  
(Puri, 2005).”  
 
LDCs have called for duty-free and quota free access for ALL their products and for such 
treatment to be BOUND under the WTO. For example, the Fourth LDC Trade Ministers’ 
Meeting in Livingstone (June 2005) called on the 6th WTO MC to agree on “Binding 
commitment on duty-free and quota-free market access for all products from LDCs to be 
granted and implemented immediately, on a secure, long-term, and predictable basis, 
with no restrictive measures introduced.” Both issues remain outstanding in that not all 
WTO members provide LDCs with fully free trade treatment, apart from EBA and AGOA 
and some GSP schemes, and all such treatment provided so far are not bound in the 
WTO. Such treatment is sanctioned by Part IV of GATT and the Enabling Clause. In 
terms of similar treatment that could be provided by developing countries in a position 
to do so, some progress is taking place, mostly within the  context of South-South 
regional trade agreements. In terms of legal coverage for South-South preferences, a 
waiver has been provided. 
 
A related issue is for LDCs to be granted exemptions from tariff and subsidy reduction 
commitments. Addressing the deeper end of Trade Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) 
is also a key concern of LDCs in view of diversifying their production and improving 
competitiveness in traditional areas as well as emerging areas of comparative and 
competitive advantage; developing human, institutional, regulatory and R&D capacities 
and infrastructures; and achieving greater technology-intensity, value-added, value 
retention and diversification of products and competitiveness. 
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South-South cooperation 
Trade among countries of the South, by offering manifold opportunities to developing 
countries to increase their profile in international trade, can have a decisive influence in 
shaping any “new trade geography”. Today, South-South trade accounts for just over 
one tenth of total world trade, and is growing at double the rate. Moreover, over 40 per 
cent of developing country exports are to other developing countries, and trade among 
them is increasing at double-digit annual rates (UNCTAD, 2003b as cited in 
Puri,2005:43). South-South trade in services is also on the rise and has substantial 
possibilities. LDCs also need to take advantage of the opportunities offered by South 
South trade cooperation and integration. The share of LDC exports to other developing 
countries has shown a robust growth from 22 per cent in 1998 to more than 31 per cent 
in 2003. South-South economic and trade co-operation therefore offers additional 
opportunities to LDC’s for assured development gains from the trading system 
(Puri,2005:43). 
 
In terms of trade or tariff preferences, many developing countries have been providing 
special tariff concessions for LDCs, including Duty-Free, Quota-Free Treatment 
(DFQFT) elements, as part of regional trade and economic cooperation agreements. 
Whilst it is true those developing countries with high level of poverty and populations 
engaged in similar economic activities may not be able to afford duty and quota free 
market access across the board for LDCs, those in a position to do so could take recourse 
to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSTP) multilateral route. Several developing 
countries have granted preferential market access for LDCs and many others are willing 
to do more so under the GSTP. The GSTP has been conceived as the cornerstone of 
economic cooperation among developing countries and has been designed to give 
concrete expression to their political commitment. Estimates suggests that, if 
developing countries agree to reduce the average tariffs applied to each other by 50 per 
cent in the current GSTP round, this would generate an additional $15.5 billion in trade. 
This is not an alternative to, but a complement to the multilateral liberalization process 
(UNCTAD, 2003a; Puri,2005:43). 
 
The situation in which LDCs find themselves today is similar to that of Europe in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. At current conversion levels, a “Trade Marshall 
Plan” for LDCs should deliver development gains in the range of $62.5 billion per year. 
Bound DFQFT and preferential access on services could yield almost half of the amount. 
Additional “aid for trade” funding at, say $1 billion for 50 LDCs would be a small-ticket 
item compared to the original Marshall Plan outlays and might have a multiplier effect 
on trade and supply capacity in LDCs. It would have the advantage of covering most 
aspects of the trade-related enabling and empowering that LDCs require in order to reap 
real development benefits. It would cushion  adjustment shocks and build productive 
capacity, competitiveness and critical infrastructure. It would stimulate export 
expansion and improve terms of trade; spur economic growth, employment generation 
and poverty reduction and gender equity; and register efficiency gains. In a symbiotic 
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response, these LDCs in turn will become new and viable markets for other countries, 
including the developed ones, and contribute to the sustainability of the “global 
enterprise”. 
 
Developed countries tended to argue that it was important to agree on a coherent vision 
on especially the principles and objectives of SDT before engaging in negotiations on 
agreement-specific issues. They argued that the deliberations should proceed first with 
clarifying the purpose of SDT and other crosscutting systemic and institutional issues 
before discussing agreement-specific proposals. This raised the very difficult 
differentiation debate i.e., tailoring SDT to those developing countries that need them 
the most and to move away from generalised SDT, and graduate those developing 
countries that would not need them owing to their competitive trading situation (Third 
World Network, 2005: 32). 
 
Developing countries, in contrast, tended to favour the resolution of agreement specific 
considerations first rather than engaging in a debate on principles which in any case are 
already well established in Part IV of the GATT and the Enabling Clause. Developing 
countries were also resistant to the notion of differentiation and graduation in relation 
to beneficiaries of SDT provisions, and definition of developing countries (Third World 
Network, 2005: 33). 
 
3. Discussions 
 
The least-developed countries receive extra attention in the WTO. All the WTO 
agreements recognize that they must benefit from the greatest possible flexibility, and 
better-off members must make extra efforts to lower import barriers on least-developed 
countries’ exports. Since the Uruguay Round agreements were signed in 1994, several 
decisions in favour of least-developed countries have been taken. 
Meeting in Singapore in 1996, WTO ministers agreed on a “Plan of Action for Least-
Developed Countries”. This included technical assistance to enable them to participate 
better in the multilateral system and a pledge from developed countries to improved 
market access for least-developed countries’ products. 
 
A year later, in October 1997, six international organizations — the International 
Monetary Fund, the International Trade Centre, the United Nations Conference for 
Trade and Development, the United Nations Development Programme, the World 
Bank and the WTO — launched the “Integrated Framework”, a joint technical assistance 
programme exclusively for least-developed countries. In 2002, the WTO adopted a work 
programme for least-developed countries. It contains several broad elements: improved 
market access; more technical assistance; support for agencies working on the 
diversification of least-developed countries’ economies; help in following the work of the 
WTO; and a speedier membership process for least-developed countries negotiating to 
join the WTO.At the same time, more and more member governments have unilaterally 
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scrapped import duties and import quotas on all exports from least-developed 
countries. 
 
Further, crisis in the WTO on the agriculture negotiations is two-fold. The first arises 
from the fact that countries are pursuing different objectives and serving different 
interests. Large exporting countries — the U.S. and European Union want market access 
for their exports at all costs (Dubey,1996; Gulati, and Ketly, 1999). The least developed 
countries, the developing countries; Europe and Japan put social, economic and 
environmental sustainability as higher objectives than trade. For the South, socio-
economic sustainability has high priority, whereas for Europe, environmental 
sustainability is important. But, in spite of major differences, a large group of countries 
put “food and agriculture first” however this must be the objective of WTO reform.  
 
It can be viewed that developing countries should have freedom in fixing tariffs in 
agriculture, especially in the face of high Northern subsidies. Trade liberalization cannot 
set the determining framework for how food is produced and how agriculture is 
organized. Countries cannot ignore the issues of economic, social, and environmental 
sustainability. One can find a fault with WTO is that it has externalized these basic 
issues in the AoA (Rena,2006b:75).  
 
The second source of the crisis arises from the process itself. The WTO as a system 
excludes and marginalizes the concerns of developing countries (Mathur, 2002). After 
the failure of the Seattle Ministerial Conference, the most frequently used phrase was 
that the WTO is a “member-driven organization”. However, the process since ‘Doha 
Conference’ shows the opposite (WTO, 2000).  
In the last 10 years and more during the course of the negotiations, the attention placed 
on the issues has weakened despite vigorous efforts by developing countries to raise 
their profile so as to address them, and the effort of the WTO leading the search for 
solutions on these issues. The issues remain to be adequately and meaningfully 
addressed. This is a major concern because implementation issues constituted 
outstanding issues from the Uruguay Round. There is urgency to finding concrete 
solutions on a priority and time-bound basis prior to developing countries assuming 
new commitments (and new implementation obligations). 
 
Table 1. GATT and WTO trade rounds 
 
Name  Start  Duration  Countries  Subjects covered  Achievements  
Geneva  April 1946  7 months  23  Tariffs  
Signing of GATT, 45,000 tariff 
concessions affecting $10 billion 
of trade  
Annecy  April 1949  5 months  13  Tariffs  Countries exchanged some 5,000 tariff concessions  
Torquay  September 1950  8 months  38  Tariffs  
Countries exchanged some 8,700 
tariff concessions, cutting the 
1948 tariff levels by 25%  
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Geneva 
II  
January 
1956  5 months  26  
Tariffs, admission of 
Japan  $2.5 billion in tariff reductions  
Dillon  September 1960  
11 
months  26  Tariffs  
Tariff concessions worth $4.9 
billion of world trade  
Kennedy  May 1964  37 
months  62  Tariffs, Anti-dumping  
Tariff concessions worth $40 
billion of world trade  
Tokyo  September 1973  
74 
months  102  
Tariffs, non-tariff 
measures, "framework" 
agreements  
Tariff reductions worth more 
than $300 billion dollars 
achieved  
Uruguay  September 1986  
87 
months  123  
Tariffs, non-tariff 
measures, rules, services, 
intellectual property, 
dispute settlement, 
textiles, agriculture, 
creation of WTO, etc  
The round led to the creation of 
WTO, and extended the range of 
trade negotiations, leading to 
major reductions in tariffs (about 
40%) and agricultural subsidies, 
an agreement to allow full access 
for textiles and clothing from 
developing countries, and an 
extension of intellectual property 
rights.  
Doha  November 2001  ?  141  
Tariffs, non-tariff 
measures, agriculture, 
labor standards, 
environment, competition, 
investment, transparency, 
patents etc  
The round is not yet concluded.  
 
Source: Wikipedia, 2012.  
 
 
Development issues and Doha Work Programme 
“Development issues” lie at the heart of the negotiations and any outcomes of the Doha 
Work Programme (DWP). This arises from the commitment to place the needs and 
interests of developing countries at the heart of the work programme. A development-
oriented outcome will give credibility to the appellation – Doha “Development” Agenda 
– without which, the appellation will be a name without any real meaning. Without 
mainstreaming development, the DWP will lack justification as not responding to the 
concerns of effective integration of developing countries into the MTS. It would 
strengthen the hands of those who argue that WTO is antidevelopment. It would 
enhance the perception by many that the erosion of development that took place in the 
Uruguay Round, through limited attention to SDT, is perpetuated(Third World 
Network, 2005: 64). 
 
A round without development can sow the seeds for the eventual damaging of the MTS 
as it will erode the confidence and commitment of the large majority of the membership 
of the WTO in such a system. It will make it difficult for developing countries to accept 
to negotiate another new round, once the Doha negotiations are completed. Yet 
development issues have been the most difficult of issues to address in the last 10 years 
and over since the launching of the DWP. The missed deadlines in addressing them has 
disturbed the balance of interests attained at the Doha Ministerial Conference in which 
developing countries basically agreed to the launching of a new round of negotiations as 
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long as their development issues were addressed on a priority basis before entering into 
new market access commitments and rules negotiations. 
 
While developing countries have individually and jointly made proposals on a series of 
development issues, resulting in the proposed 88 SDT agreement specific issues and 
over 100 implementation issues, and various attempts at discussing and addressing 
these issues, very limited progress forward in terms of concrete, substantive outcomes 
have been achieved. In the meanwhile, as the negotiations proceed, the concerns of 
developing countries with respect to development have fortified with newer, specific 
trade and development concerns raised in the market access negotiations (Third World 
Network, 2005: 64-65). Thus, the 6th WTO MC and beyond would be seized with 
concretely, specifically, adequately and expeditiously addressing the development 
issues. This will be a challenge for developing countries in re-examining the SDT and 
implementation proposals to ascertain their relevance, 
 
• prioritising them in terms of their commercial and development values, and 
preserving and enhancing them; 
• expediting examination and proposals of measures to address specific needs of 
small, vulnerable economies and also with the work with other nonnegotiating 
working groups (trade and transfer of technology, and trade and debt and 
finance); 
• mainstreaming into the agriculture and NAMA negotiations the specific trade 
and development needs of developing countries and in this context, seek both 
trade and development related solutions to the problems of trade preferences and 
commodities; 
• monitoring implementation of commitments on technical assistance, and  
• meeting the specific needs of LDCs including through mobilising increased 
support for the IF and especially for Joint Integrated Trade Assistance 
Programme (JITAP). 
 
For their part, developed countries must accept not only in principle and spirit that 
development matters, but that this principle must find concrete expression in the Doha 
negotiations and its outcomes. Concrete progress must be achieved on development 
issues generally and especially in respect of SDT and implementation issues, as well as 
specifically in the market access negotiations (agriculture, NAMA, services). 
 
Finalisation of the work on small economies and other non-negotiating work is also 
important to developing countries in terms of addressing their wider development 
concerns and thus creating an enabling trading environment in which these countries 
can trade in and develop. Ultimately, the functioning of the MTS under the auspices of 
the WTO in an equitable manner that addresses the development needs and concerns of 
developing countries is in the interest not only of these countries, but also of other 
countries and the MTS itself. Self-interest and preservation of economies suggest that 
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enlightened development solidarity between all WTO Members is needed in giving a 
boost to and resolving thoroughly, effectively and adequately the development issues 
(Third World Network, 2005: 67). The MTS has to move beyond a purely trade 
liberalising approach to one which enables development, job creation, poverty 
reduction, and wider and affordable access to essential goods and services. In this 
regard, the development promise of Doha is timely and crucial and it must be fully 
redeemed. 
 
Apart from the fact that much remains to be accomplished in terms of the specifics on 
the frameworks and recommendations in the Decision and other aspects of the DWP, 
other factors can cause a delay in the negotiations in reaching the new deadlines set. 
One such factor is the relentless move towards regional trade agreements by all 
countries, mostly as an insurance policy against limited market access openings at the 
multilateral level. Some apprehension also surfaced regarding the focus of attention 
(away from negotiations) on the election of the new WTO Director General, and the 
installation of the new US administration and new EC administration and the setting of 
their priorities on international trade. In retrospect such fears were groundless as the 
negotiations post-July Package progressed and there had been renewed expressions of 
commitment to the round (Third World Network, 2005:18). 
 
 
4. Role of WTO – A Critical View  
 
Ten years ago, a new World Trade Organisation that put developing country needs at the 
centre of the international trade negotiation agenda was proposed. The Ministerial 
Declaration adopted at the start of the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations, 
on 14 November 2001, was a promising response to the anti-globalisation riots of the 
1990s. But the WTO membership has failed to deliver the promised pro-development 
changes. Finding "development" in the Doha Development Round today is like looking 
for a needle in a haystack. Developing countries have been completely sidelined by the 
economic and political interests of global powers. According to the Guardian1, here are 
10 examples of how the WTO has failed the poor: 
 
1. Cotton: the Fair trade Foundation revealed last year how the $47bn in subsidies paid 
to rich-country producers in the past 10 years has created barriers for the 15 million 
cotton farmers across west Africa trying to trade their way out of poverty, and how 5 
million of the world's poorest farming families have been forced out of business and into 
deeper poverty because of those subsidies. 
 
                                                          
1
 Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/14/wto-fails-
developing-countries retrieved on 28 May 2012. 
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2. Agricultural subsidies: beyond cotton, WTO members have failed even to agree 
how to reduce the huge subsidies paid to rich world farmers, whose overproduction 
continues to threaten the livelihoods of developing world farmers. 
 
3. Trade agreements: the WTO has also failed to clarify the deliberately ambiguous 
rules on concluding trade agreements that allow the poorest countries to be 
manipulated by the rich states. In Africa, in negotiations with the EU, countries have 
been forced to eliminate tariffs on up to 90% of their trade because no clear rules exist 
to protect them. 
 
4. Special treatment: the rules for developing countries, called "special and 
differential treatment" rules, were meant to be reviewed to make them more precise, 
effective and operational. But the WTO has failed to work through the 88 proposals that 
would fill the legal vacuum. 
 
5. Medicine: the poorest in developing countries are unable to access affordable 
medicine because members have failed to clarify ambiguities between the need for 
governments to protect public health on one hand and on the other to protect 
the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical companies. 
 
6. Legal costs: the WTO pledged to improve access to its expensive and complex legal 
system, but has failed. In 15 years of dispute settlement under the WTO, 400 cases have 
been initiated. No African country has acted as a complainant and only one least 
developed country has ever filed a claim. 
 
7. Protectionist economic policies: one of the WTO's five core functions agreed at 
its inception in 1995 was to achieve more coherence in global economic policy-making. 
Yet the WTO failed to curb the speedy increase in the number of protectionist 
measures applied by G20 countries in response to the global economic crisis over the 
past two years – despite G20 leaders' repeated affirmations of their "unwavering" 
commitment to resist all forms of protectionist measures. 
 
8. Natural disaster: the WTO fails to alleviate suffering when it has the opportunity 
to do so. In the case of natural disaster, the membership will have taken almost two 
years to agree and implement temporary trade concessions for Pakistan, where severe 
flooding displaced 20 million people in 2010 and caused $10bn of damage. Those 
measures, according to the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, would have boosted Pakistan's exports to the EU by at least €100m this 
year. 
 
9. Decision-making: the WTO makes most of its decisions by consensus – and 
achieving consensus between 153 countries is nearly impossible. But this shows another 
University of the Western Cape Repository  ravinder.rena2006@gmail.com  
 
failure of the WTO: to break the link between market size and political weight that 
would give small and poor countries a voice in the trade negotiations. 
 
10. Fair trade: 10 years after the start of the Doha Development Round, governments 
have failed to make trade fair. As long as small and poor countries remain without a 
voice, the role of campaigning organisations, such as Traidcraft and Fairtrade 
Foundation, which are working together to eliminate cotton subsidies, will remain 
critical. 
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5. Conclusion  
 
The WTO has failed to live up to its promises over the past decade, which reveals a wider 
systemic problem in the global community. True and lasting solutions to global 
economic problems can only come when the model of global competitiveness between 
countries becomes one of genuine cooperation. 
However, the journey so far in redeeming the development promise of Doha has been 
full of broken promises and missed deadlines, including the July 2005 deadline and 
beyond. This setback follows on the heels of the important breakthrough in the 
negotiations attained in the July 2004 package with regard to development issues. The 
lack of substantive movement is evident in almost all areas of development matters, 
including that concerning special and differential treatment, implementation, specific 
trade-related needs and concerns of developing countries, and, to a lesser extent, 
technical assistance. Will mainstreaming development into the WTO and the MTS be a 
myth or a fact that can be realised to meet the expectations of developing countries? Can 
the development promise of Doha, which is timely and crucial and deserves to be fully 
redeemed, be translated into concrete steps in the period leading to the coming 6th WTO 
Ministerial Conference and beyond? This paper attempts to answer some of these 
important and pressing questions in the context of developing countries. 
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